The Azerbaijan State News Agency (AZERTAC) presents an interview with Caucasus and Middle East expert Dr. Dünya Bashol.

- Dr. Bashol, how do you assess Azerbaijan's role in strengthening stability in the South Caucasus after the Second Garabagh War? What positive examples of interaction with neighboring countries can you highlight?

- Azerbaijan's most significant contribution was demonstrating that so-called "frozen conflicts" can be resolved through decisive action in an era when major powers are less willing or able to enforce the status quo. For three decades, the Garabagh conflict sat at the heart of the South Caucasus, deterring major infrastructure investments and blocking regional trade routes due to the ever-present expectation of renewed hostilities.

With the Second Garabagh War concluded and Azerbaijan having restored control over its internationally recognized territory, the conditions for lasting stability have substantially improved. The subsequent diplomatic processes, mainly U.S. led, have created a framework for normalizing relations across the region.

As for positive examples of interaction, we can point to several developments. The Nakhchivan gas interconnector with Türkiye has deepened energy cooperation. Discussions on the Zangezur corridor, despite ongoing negotiations over its precise terms, signal a shared recognition that connectivity benefits all parties. Armenia and Azerbaijan have made incremental progress on border delimitation, and trilateral formats involving Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Georgia continue to advance regional integration.

Of course, challenges remain. Peace treaty negotiations are incomplete and mutual trust is still fragile but the fundamental obstacle that paralyzed the region for decades has been removed, opening possibilities for free trade and international investment that were previously unthinkable.

- In 2025, Azerbaijan and Armenia took significant steps toward normalizing relations, including initialing a peace agreement and declaring the unblocking of communications at the Washington summit. How do you assess the significance of these achievements for long-term peace in the region?

- The initialing of the peace agreement and the Washington summit's declaration on unblocking communications represent a qualitative shift, moving from conflict management to genuine normalization. While Azerbaijan may appear to be the primary beneficiary of these developments, the reality is that sustainable peace creates winners across the region.

For three decades, both countries bore enormous costs. Armenia faced increasing diplomatic isolation and economic stagnation, while Azerbaijan had to channel disproportionate resources toward the liberation of its territories. Now, with that chapter closed, both can redirect energy toward development. Armenia stands to gain access to Turkish markets, a potential reduction in military expenditures, and the revival of railway connections through Nakhchivan that could transform its economic geography. Azerbaijan gains secure borders and the ability to fully operationalize both the east-west and north-south international trade and energy corridors.

I would also note that the closure of the OSCE Minsk Process and related structures may ultimately prove beneficial. For decades, the co-chair format with its competing French, Russian, and American agendas perpetuated ambiguity rather than resolution. The Group's consensus-based structure made decisive action impossible, effectively freezing the conflict rather than solving it. Now, with regional actors engaging directly and through bilateral formats, there is greater ownership of the peace process and less room for external powers to instrumentalize Caucasian disputes for their own strategic purposes.

— The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) project and other initiatives in the field of transit and transport corridors are opening new opportunities for regional cooperation. How do these projects reflect Azerbaijan’s geopolitical role after the war?

- The TRIPP project demonstrates Azerbaijan’s preference for cooperative solutions rather than coercion. Despite achieving military and political superiority, Baku chose to accept American mediation instead of imposing the corridor by force.

Beyond the Trump Route, Azerbaijan has positioned itself at the intersection of several major corridor initiatives. The Middle Corridor, or Trans-Caspian route, has received a significant boost as an alternative to Russian transit following the war in Ukraine, with Azerbaijani ports and railways becoming critical infrastructure for trade between Europe and China. The potential Zangezur Corridor could connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan and further on to Türkiye. The North–South corridor, linking Russia with Iran through Azerbaijani territory, adds yet another dimension. Taken together, these projects transform Azerbaijan from a regional player into an indispensable transit hub, and whoever controls such a point of intersection gains substantial leverage.

This reflects a broader pattern in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy — the ability to maintain productive relations simultaneously with competing centers of power. Baku preserves close ties with Türkiye while maintaining working relations with Moscow. It has developed significant security cooperation with Israel without severing relations with Türkiye and Iran. It participates in EU mediation efforts while at the same time welcoming American diplomatic initiatives. Instead of being squeezed between rival great powers and forced into a one-sided choice, Azerbaijan has built strategic autonomy, securing for itself the role of a partner rather than a pawn in regional geopolitics.

— In 2025, Azerbaijan conducted diplomatic consultations with more than 50 countries. In your view, which directions of foreign-policy dialogue are today the most promising for Baku on the international stage?

- The expansion of Azerbaijan’s diplomatic activity to more than fifty countries reflects a carefully considered diversification strategy, and I would single out six particularly promising directions of foreign-policy dialogue for Baku.

First and foremost is the strategic alliance with Türkiye, which remains the cornerstone of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. The formula “one nation — two states” has evolved from a rhetorical slogan into a comprehensive partnership encompassing defense cooperation, energy integration, and coordinated diplomacy. Türkiye’s military support played a decisive role during the Second Garabagh War, and subsequent agreements institutionalized these relations. For Azerbaijan, this alliance provides security guarantees, access to NATO-standard military technologies, and entry into Türkiye’s broader diplomatic networks. This alliance also anchors Azerbaijan in the Turkic world, where the Organization of Turkic States serves as another multilateral platform for influence.

Second, the strategic partnership with Israel is one of the most significant directions of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. Defense cooperation is of particular importance: Israeli drones, precision-guided munitions, and intelligence systems played a key role in Azerbaijan’s military success during the Second Garabagh War. Beyond defense, the relationship includes energy cooperation — Azerbaijan supplies a substantial share of Israel’s oil imports — as well as intelligence sharing on issues of mutual concern. For Azerbaijan, these relations mean access to advanced military technologies and entry into Israeli diplomatic channels, particularly in Washington.

Third, energy diplomacy remains Azerbaijan’s most valuable asset, but its character is changing. At a time when European states are actively seeking alternatives to Russian gas, Azerbaijan is becoming a critically important partner not only as a supplier, but also as a reliable transit corridor for Caspian and potentially Central Asian resources. The Southern Gas Corridor and the TAP pipeline have already significantly elevated Baku’s status in European capitals, and there is substantial potential for further deepening these partnerships through long-term contracts and joint infrastructure investments.

Fourth, connectivity and transit diplomacy holds great potential. Azerbaijan lies at the crossroads of the Middle Corridor, possible North–South routes, and the emerging Trump Route initiative. Countries ranging from China to the European Union have a strategic interest in these transport networks, which gives Baku leverage to negotiate on favorable terms and allows it to position itself as an indispensable logistics hub.

Another extremely important factor is the growing significance of engagement with the Global South. Azerbaijan’s chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement in 2019–2024 and its narrative of strategic autonomy resonate with states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that are seeking development models not tied to alignment with a single geopolitical bloc. Expanding diplomatic presence in these regions opens new markets, builds voting coalitions in international organizations, and strengthens Azerbaijan’s image as an independent and sovereign actor on the world stage.

— President Ilham Aliyev recently summed up the results of the foreign-policy strategy for 2025, noting significant achievements. Which factors, in your view, have particularly strengthened Azerbaijan’s international image?

- Several interrelated factors have strengthened Azerbaijan’s international image, but the most significant among them has been a fundamental shift in how the country is perceived globally.

What we have witnessed in recent years is a comprehensive process of “repositioning,” achieved not through PR campaigns but through demonstrated strategic competence.

Today, Azerbaijan is increasingly perceived as a dynamic regional power maintaining a complex network of diplomatic relations with all key global and regional actors. Baku preserves close alliances with Türkiye and Israel while maintaining working relations with Russia and managing delicate ties with Iran. It engages constructively with European institutions, welcomes American diplomatic initiatives, and expands its presence in the Global South. This is not the behavior of a peripheral oil state; it is the diplomacy of a confident “middle power” that knows how to leverage its geography and resources.

A defining feature of Azerbaijan’s approach is the fine calibration of this balancing act. Rather than becoming a client state of one power or a militarized “garrison state,” Baku has opted for economic development, connectivity, and investment in infrastructure. The emphasis on corridors, transit routes, and energy partnerships reflects a strategic choice — to create prosperity and interdependence rather than accumulate purely military capabilities.

The liberation of Garabagh deserves particular attention in this context — not only as a national achievement, but also as an indicator of an emerging international order. We are entering an era in which classical realism is reasserting itself: states with legitimate claims and sufficient capabilities can act decisively when a window of opportunity opens. The Second Garabagh War demonstrated that medium-sized states, willing to invest in military modernization, build the right alliances, and wait for the appropriate geopolitical moment, are capable of achieving goals that seemed unattainable under the liberal post–Cold War order.

Azerbaijan correctly recognized this shift and acted accordingly. It did not wait for international institutions to deliver justice, but instead created the capacity to defend its own interests, while preserving enough diplomatic flexibility to peacefully consolidate the results afterward.

In other words, the strengthening of Azerbaijan’s international image is not the result of any single achievement, but of a consistent pattern of behavior demonstrating strategic maturity: the ability to understand when to fight and when to negotiate; the capacity to balance between competing centers of power without becoming dependent on any of them; and the ability to convert military success into long-term diplomatic and economic advantages.