The presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Sadyr Japarov and Emomali Rahmon, respectively – took part in a meeting of the Collective Security Council of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Moscow on November 11. For the three Central Asian countries, the meeting provided an opportunity to discuss regional security, countering cross-border threats and further developing cooperation mechanisms within the organization.
Ahead of the summit, a joint meeting of the foreign and defense ministers and the secretaries of the security councils of CSTO member states was held in Moscow on November 10. Participants discussed the military and political situation in the organization's area of responsibility, international and regional threats, and areas for further cooperation.
Following the meeting, draft documents were approved on the development of the Collective Aviation Forces and air defense systems, ensuring biological security, and several joint political statements. The documents included a draft final declaration of the summit and an agreement on the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly. The documents were to be considered by the heads of state at the November 11 meeting.
The three Central Asian members, however, have placed different emphasis on cooperation within the organization. Kazakhstan is focused on improving coordination mechanisms, Kyrgyzstan highlights a broad range of regional threats, while the security of its southern borders remains one of Tajikistan's main priorities.
At the joint meeting on November 10, Kazakhstan's Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu presented the country's approach to strengthening cooperation within the CSTO and put forward a number of proposals for the organization's further development. According to Kazakhstan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, participants also reviewed the CSTO's work in 2026 and discussed its priorities for 2027.
Astana's current proposals should be considered in the context of the country's earlier initiatives. During Kazakhstan's CSTO chairmanship in 2024, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev advocated improving the regulatory framework for the operational deployment of collective forces, including procedures for the transit of military contingents and military aircraft.
Other areas identified at the time included military training, the development of peacekeeping capabilities, countering terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, illegal arms trade and cybercrime, as well as joint responses to emergencies.
These initiatives indicate that Kazakhstan views security not only in terms of military capabilities but also in terms of coordination among government agencies. The country places importance on predictable cooperation mechanisms in crisis situations and the ability to coordinate action with neighboring states in response to cross-border threats.
Kyrgyzstan, in turn, outlined a broader range of challenges relevant to Central Asia at the preparatory meeting on November 10. In his address, Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev highlighted the need for joint efforts to counter terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime and cyber threats.
The Kyrgyz side also expressed its readiness to support the implementation of Tajikistan's priorities during its CSTO chairmanship in 2027. In addition, participants agreed on draft documents, including the Collective Security Council declaration, an action plan marking the anniversaries of the Collective Security Treaty and the organization, and a statement on the role of interparliamentary cooperation.
Bishkek is attending the current meeting following the completion of its CSTO chairmanship in 2025. At the summit held in Kyrgyzstan that year, a package of 15 documents was adopted, including the Collective Security Strategy, the Anti-Drug Strategy for 2026–2030 and the Military Cooperation Development Plan for 2026–2030.
Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov had previously outlined the country's own priorities within the CSTO. Speaking at the organization's summit in Astana on November 28, 2024, he said Bishkek intended to focus on strengthening foreign policy cooperation, developing the organization's military and peacekeeping capabilities, and improving the effectiveness of military and economic cooperation.
Japarov also called for closer cooperation between the CSTO and relevant structures of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in combating international terrorism. Other areas he identified included countering the use of information technology for terrorist and extremist purposes, developing cooperation in cybersecurity and biological security, and combating drug trafficking. In particular, Kyrgyzstan planned to hold an international cybersecurity conference in 2025.
Thus, one of Kyrgyzstan's current priorities remains the practical implementation of previously agreed documents. At the same time, Kulubaev's emphasis on threats related to organized crime and cybersecurity points to Bishkek's interest in a broader approach to regional security that extends beyond traditional military cooperation.
For Tajikistan, the Afghan direction is of key importance. One of the main instruments of Dushanbe's cooperation with the CSTO in this area is a targeted program to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan border, which runs through 2029.
The program provides for the phased provision of equipment for border infrastructure. In 2026–2027, the focus is expected to be on the most important sections, while the 2027–2029 phase is intended to cover the entire state border. During the first phase, CSTO member states agreed on lists of weapons and military equipment for Tajikistan's border units. The next steps include completing the necessary documentation, identifying suppliers and signing contracts.
For Dushanbe, the program has practical significance given the continuing risks associated with instability in Afghanistan. Potential threats to the region include cross-border crime, drug trafficking and the activities of extremist groups.
At the same time, Tajikistan views the Afghan direction not only through the framework of bilateral border security. Dushanbe has previously called for coordinated efforts by the CSTO, CIS and SCO to counter threats originating from Afghanistan.
President Emomali Rahmon has also previously put forward initiatives aimed at expanding practical security cooperation mechanisms. Speaking at the CSTO summit in Bishkek on November 27, 2025, he emphasized the importance of establishing a CSTO Humanitarian Response Center in Tajikistan and expressed confidence that other member states would support the initiative.
In addition, Rahmon proposed establishing cooperation between CIS structures and the SCO Anti-Drug Center, which is planned to be established in Dushanbe. He also drew attention to the use of digital space, including artificial intelligence technologies, by terrorist and extremist groups, stressing the need for prompt information exchange and the use of new digital tools to counter such threats.
Tajikistan's upcoming CSTO chairmanship, which will begin on January 1, 2027, is also gaining importance. On November 10, Tajik Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin informed participants at the joint meeting about the priorities of the country's forthcoming chairmanship. However, the Russian Foreign Ministry's published statement did not provide a detailed list of these priorities.
The chairmanship will allow Dushanbe to shape the organization's agenda for the coming year, including by taking into account issues of direct interest to Tajikistan. However, the specific outcomes will depend on whether the initiatives can be agreed upon with other members and whether sufficient resources are available to implement joint programs.
More broadly, the differences in the approaches of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan reflect their varying perceptions of regional security priorities. Astana places importance on coordination and rapid response mechanisms, Bishkek focuses on a range of cross-border threats, while Dushanbe is primarily interested in strengthening its southern borders and providing material and technical support to its border units.
Cooperation could develop along several possible paths. The first scenario involves strengthening the CSTO's traditional military component, including the development of collective aviation forces, air defense systems and joint response mechanisms. In this case, the practical implementation of decisions agreed upon at the Moscow meeting will be particularly important.
Another possibility is an expansion of the organization's agenda to include biological security, cyber threats, drug trafficking and organized crime. This would require closer cooperation among relevant government agencies, information sharing and the coordination of common approaches to emerging threats.
A further scenario would involve cooperation developing primarily through political agreements and the adoption of strategic documents, while the implementation of specific projects remains dependent on the financial and organizational capabilities of individual states. Under this scenario, the pace of implementation could vary, particularly in areas requiring substantial material resources.
Finally, differences in national interests and foreign policy approaches among member states could limit further integration. In that case, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan may continue to use specific CSTO mechanisms in areas where their interests overlap, while maintaining independence in setting their national security priorities.
Ultimately, the CSTO's future role in Central Asia will depend on the organization's ability to ensure the implementation of agreed decisions and take into account the differing needs of regional states. For Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, the key issue will remain the practical benefits of CSTO membership and the extent to which its mechanisms can be used to address specific national and regional security challenges.
