AZERTAC presents an interview with French political scientist Maxime Gauin.

- How do you assess the key results of the Washington summit for the South Caucasus region?

- It is one more step—and a crucial one—toward the signature of the peace treaty properly speaking. The content of the American-brokered agreement and the tone used by both Ilham Aliyev and Nikol Pashinyan prove the success in this regard. Now, the Armenian Prime Minister has one more argument to obtain the necessary change of the Constitution: The agreements signed with Azerbaijan and America. He can answer the slander of the Armenian opposition, who accuse him to make excessive concessions and to obtain nothing in exchange. Naturally, the suspension of the 907 section is an important achievement for your country. The practical conditions for the implementation of Zangezur corridor remain to be seen, but in itself, it is positive, it is even a relief to have reached a compromise. Azerbaijan is satisfied and nobody can seriously pretend that this is a loss of sovereignty for Armenia.

- What do you think is France's current position on the Zangezur corridor and related transport and political projects? What is France's position in connection with the fact that the OSCE Minsk Group has effectively ceased to exist by mutual agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, given that Paris has actively supported its work for many years?

- The position has been publicly expressed and is clear: “France welcomes the announcement today in Washington, under the aegis of President Trump, of an agreement between President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan aimed to normalize relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.” The communiqué continues in saying that France joins in the common appeal to dissolve the Minsk group and wishes to see the treaty signed and ratified as soon as possible. No reservation concerning the Zangezur corridor has been expressed. The main concern of Paris was that this issue could be used by the Armenian opposition, Russia and Iran to discredit Nikol Pashinyan. Since a compromise has been found, this fear does not exist anymore.

- To what extent, in your opinion, is France ready to play an active role in the settlement of Azerbaijani-Armenian relations and support for regional stability? In light of the Washington summit, can we expect a revision or adjustment of France's approach to key security issues and infrastructure projects in the South Caucasus?

- The main concern of France was to avoid a collapse of Nikol Pashinyan and his replacement by Robert Kocharyan or a person of this kind. The official reaction I quoted confirms that. But there is something else: The misunderstandings of the previous period (autumn 2022-spring 2025) are fading away. It was already visible during the meeting between Emmanuel Macron and Ilham Aliyev in May, then with the Azerbaijani reactions to the verdict of the appeal court of Paris, increasing the sentence of Loris Toufanian (a former leader of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation’s youth branch, who established a dissident group in 2016) for his vandalism of your embassy in France in July, and, the same month, the attendance of National Day organized by the French embassy in Baku (there were more Azerbaijani officials than in 2023 and 2024). It is safe to assume that the French support for the end of the Minsk group is welcomed in Baku and that the delivery of a new batch of material aid to Ukraine by your country is welcomed in Paris.

As you mention regional stability, I would like to remind you that France gave its green light in December 2024 to the export of Meteor air-to-air missiles to Türkiye. The Meteor is a European missile, but largely French. It has no equivalent in the world by its speed, its range, its maneuverability and its insensitivity to decoy. It has been sold to Greece years ago. This export to Türkiye, and the export of Eurofighter jets to the same country (accepted by Germany in 2025), restore the parity with Greece in the air.

Another important element is the excellence of the relations of France with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in the political, economic, military and cultural fields. You know well that these two Turkic countries are crucial for the infrastructure projects in the South Caucasus.

– In light of the new agreements between Baku and Yerevan, including issues of transport and energy infrastructure, how does France see its opportunities to participate in supporting regional integration and economic cooperation?

- First, there is the already existing presence in Türkiye. The historical record of bilateral trade with France has been broken in 2024 and could be broken again this year; one of the four international subsidiaries of Bouygues construction is headquartered in Istanbul; Vinci construction has several Turkish subsidiaries), Armenia, Azerbaijan (TotalEnergies has signed a giant contract with your country in 2023, as you know; two subsidiaries of Vinci construction exist in Baku) and Central Asia. Then, contracts already signed in other parts of the world, such as the ones obtained by Alstom in Mexico (2021), UK (2024), Germany (2024), Morocco (2025) and New York (2025) for trains, SNCF in Czechia (2021) for rail network, Airbus Aerials and Delair for the monitoring of the electric lines in Georgia, USA (2017), EDF in UK for nuclear plants (2025) could be used as precedents for the South Caucasus, Central Asia and Türkiye.

Given the importance of Airbus planes in the fleet of THY, AZAL, Air Astana, etc., it is logical to expect Airbus (a European company headquartered in France, where the majority of its plane are made) to take part to the future aerial communications.

If everything is going fine, the discussions for the sale of boats protecting oil field to Azerbaijan could re-start, why not in transforming the project into a joint contract with Kazakhstan, which would provide coherent and compatible fleets to both countries, like Greece and Croatia (soon joined by Serbia) have a fleet of Rafales with a joint chain of supply.

- An EU observer mission has been operating on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border in recent years. What prospects do you think await this mission now?

- The article VII of the peace treaty says: “The Parties shall not deploy along their mutual border forces of any third party. The Parties, pending the delimitation and subsequent demarcation of their mutual border, shall implement mutually agreed security and confidence-building measures, including in the military field, with a view to ensuring security and stability in the border regions.” The text speaks about “forces” without limiting the ban to the military forces. In such conditions, the mission will probably leave after the ratification of the treaty. Maybe some observers will be integrated as advisors for a short period, as a transition.